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The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism
from Al Qa’ida to ISIS. By Michael Morell with Bill Harolow,
New York, NY: Hachette Book Group, 2015. ISBN 978-1-45558566-3 Notes. Appendixes. Pp.xvi, 362. $28.00.
Men and women in the military and intelligence community who witness
decisions that influence our country’s security can serve their nation one more
time by reporting on what they saw and heard. The Great War of Our Time is
such an effort that distinguishes itself from similar books by its topicality and
easy reading.
The author draws from a deep well of experiences and events. His CIA career
included being the presidential briefer, the CIA’s number three official, then
its deputy director and two stints as its acting director. Michael Morell
started at the CIA out of college as an economic analyst. An assignment that
earned him the notice of George Tenet just before Tenet became the CIA’s
director. The meat of the book starts with Morell’s tenure as the executive
assistant to Tenet.
Tenet and most, but not all other CIA directors receive favorable comments
from Morell. The book gives the author’s insights into many of the wellknown officials with whom he worked. Morell lauds Tenet for his humanity
and intelligence and for the focus that Tenet applied to counterterrorism
before the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Porter Goss, on the other hand, surrounded himself with outsiders from the
house intelligence committee and gave them too much power to the detriment
of the CIA, according to Morell. No person receives warmer praise than Leon
Panetta whom Morell describes as an excellent director and a wise man who
was self-effacing, smart, and supportive of his people.
Presidents Bush and Obama are both gently criticized for certain decisions or
traits, but also portrayed as having a human quality that may surprise their
detractors.
In addition to the personalities and decisions of presidents and CIA directors
and the events leading to them, two themes run through the book. The first is
that analysts are capable, smart people who are the voice of the agency but
who are not accorded their due respect. The first instance of this theme is
Morell’s assertion that Michael Scheuer, the CIA analyst who ran Alec Station,
the CIA’s unit that tracked and studied Osama bin Laden, received less
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support because he was an analyst in charge of the unit instead of an
operations officer.
The other theme is the CIA’s war with al-Qaida. The book recounts the
attention the CIA focused on al-Qaida prior to the September 11 attacks as
well as the conflicting assessment of the intelligence that was obtained.
After moving on from being the presidential briefer, Morell encountered
Scooter Libby on Vice President Cheney’s staff who demanded that Morell's
boss withdraw a 2002 report generated by a study group that Morell headed
to examine the tenuous connection between Saddam Hussein's regime and alQaida. The report, which found no such connection existed, was confirmed
when the files of the Iraqi intelligence agencies had no records supporting the
contention advanced by Libby and the vice president that Saddam’s regime
supported al-Qaida.
The pre-invasion assessment of Iraq recounted by the author seems prescient
in view of what has since transpired. Morell believed Saddam was not an
imminent threat. "As we approached war, the views among many Middle
Eastern specialists at CIA were decidedly antiwar. Many at the Agency were
concerned that bringing down Saddam would open a Pandora's box" (98).
More stomach churning than the Pandora’s box comment is learning that the
CIA never did an analysis of what was likely to happen post-invasion.
As part of its operations against al-Qaida, the Agency has employed a variety
of tactics including its covert prison system for storing detainees, enhanced
interrogation techniques, and armed action by unmanned aerial vehicles and
Morell discusses each in detail. A fundamental lesson highlighted by the
author is that al-Qaida lost capability when it was under pressure for its own
security. When pressure is eased, it has greater capabilities.
Drone strikes, which started under President George W. Bush and continued
by President Obama, are the single most effective tool against al-Qaida, an
opinion held by Bin Ladin according to documents captured during the raid
that killed him.
In Morell’s view, even if drone strikes create radicalized persons who become
terrorists, there is no practical alternative. This belief reveals the thinking at
the Agency. Unsaid but reasonably concluded from Morell’s discussion is that
the CIA believes the al-Qaida threat is so great that it must employ repeated
139
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/12
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1517

O’Hern: The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from Al Qa’ida to ISIS

drone strikes even at the cost of building an environment that fits the
narrative used by al-Qaida and ISIS to recruit and build a following.
Books like this one are also worthwhile for what can be drawn from the
descriptions. Take the diversity of opinion on how likely the compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan contained Osama bin Ladin. Morell told President
Obama that the circumstantial case for WMD in Iraq was stronger than the
one for Bin Ladin being present and he rated it at 60% likely. Robert Gates,
the Secretary of Defense and former CIA analyst, thought the intelligence was
weak and several times referred to watching the decision for the rescue
attempt of hostages in Iran end in Desert One. The female intelligence analyst
(apparently the one portrayed in the movie Zero Dark Thirty) deeply involved
in the assessment put the probability at 95%.
The disparity reflects different experiences. Morell had been burned by the
WMD question. Gates judged the intelligence through the lens of Desert One.
As Morell points out, the analysts at the Counter Terrorism Center who were
highly confident were influenced by a string of successes and not having
experienced an intelligence failure in their shorter careers.
Having risen to a high position in the CIA, Morell found himself attacked by
politicians arising out of the Benghazi brouhaha. Morell addresses
accusations that he had been a shill for the Obama political cause in a large
chapter devoted to the topic.
In the Benghazi chapter, Morell’s defense of the analyst community reveals
one of its shortcomings. When asked to deliver information to the White
House about the attack at the Benghazi compound, CIA analysts used the
reporting they had received but did not communicate with the Libya CIA
station.
Morell writes, "That is simply not how intelligence analysts operate. They are
analysts not investigators. They wait for information to come to them."
Relying on a protocol with which you’re very familiar is understandable, but
wouldn't the president expect that the information his intelligence agency
provided was the most up to date and accurate? This episode suggests the CIA
expected the rest of the government to conform to its procedures instead of
seeking to provide the most usable intelligence product.
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The experiences of Mr. Morell are worthy of reading and reflection. The book
benefits from the organization and storytelling skills of his cowriter, Mr.
Harlow. There aren’t many inside accounts this well told.
Steven O’Hern
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